The following case began when Dred Scott, a black slave, was taken
by his owner from Missouri, a slave state, to Illinois, a free state, and
later to Wisconsin Territory where slavery had been forbidden by the Missouri
Compromise of 1820. When Scott was brought back to Missouri, he sued
to obtain his freedom, claiming that he had become free when taken into
Wisconsin, a territory in which slavery was forbidden. The case eventually
made its way to the Supreme Court. The Court was confronted with two major
questions: First, was Scott a citizen of Missouri (if he was not, he could
not bring suit in federal court, and the court did not have jurisdiction
to resolve the case); Second, had Scott been set free by virtue of his
sojourn into the free territory of Wisconsin (or, in other words, was the
Missouri Compromise constitutional).
The court ruled that Scott was not a citizen of Missouri or of the
United States and therefore could not sue in federal court. Having
refused jurisdiction, the Court went on to rule on the other issue. The
Court decided that Scottís residence in the Wisconsin Territory did not
entitle him to freedom from slavery because Congress did not have the power
to prohibit slavery in the territories. Therefore, the Missouri Compromise
(which prohibited slavery in territories north of the 36°30í line)
violated the Constitution and was null and void.
As you read, examine the reasoning the court uses to come to its
two main conclusions that Dred Scott was not a citizen and that the Missouri
Compromise was unconstitutional.
Two days before the ruling, in his inaugural address, newly elected
president Buchanan argued that the issue of slavery in the territories
was best settled by the federal courts. On March 6, 1857 Chief Justice
Taney read the Courtís opinion. He hoped the ruling would settle the issue
of slavery in the territories once and for all. It did not.
The simple question is this: Can a Negro, whose ancestors were imported
into this country, and sold as slaves, become a member of the political
community founded and brought into existence by the Constitution of the
United States, and as such become entitled to all of the rights, and privileges...
granted [by the Constitution] to the citizen?....
We think that they are not included, and were never meant to be included,
in the word, "citizens," in the Constitution. On the contrary, they
were at that time [of the writing of the Constitution] considered as a
subordinate and inferior class of beings, who had been subjugated by the
dominant race, and whether emancipated or not, yet remained subject to
[white] authority. Rather, they should be and are considered an inferior
class of beings, who have been subjugated by the dominant race, and whether
emancipated or not, have no rights provided them but such are those held
the power and the government might choose to grant them....
In the opinion of the court, the legislation and histories of the times,
and the language used in the Declaration of Independence, show, that neither
the class of persons who had been imported as slaves, nor their descendants,
whether they had become free or not, were then acknowledged as a part of
the people, nor intended to be included in the general words [of that document]....
They had for more than a century before been considered as beings of
an inferior order... and so far inferior that they had no rights which
the white man was bound to respect... This opinion was at that time fixed
and universal.... It was regarded as an axiom in morals as well as in politics....
Dred Scott was not a citizen of Missouri within the meaning of the
Constitution of the United States, and not entitled as such to sue in its
courts; and consequently... [the federal court system] had no jurisdiction
of the case....
We proceed therefore, to inquire whether the facts relied on by the
plaintiff entitle him to his freedom....
The Act of Congress, upon which the plaintiff relies [the Missouri
Compromise] declares that slavery and involuntary servitude, except as
a punishment for a crime, shall be forever prohibited in all part of the
[Louisiana] territory... which lies north of the thirty-six degrees thirty
minute north latitude [other than Missouri].... And the difficulty which
meets us at the threshold of this part of the inquiry is, whether Congress
was authorized to pass this law under any of the powers granted to it by
the Constitution; for, if the authority is not given to it by that instrument,
then it is the duty of this court to declare it void and inoperative, and
incapable of conferring freedom any one who is held a slave under the laws
of any one of the States.
The counsel for the plaintiff has laid much stress upon the article
in the Constitution which confers on Congress the power to "dispose of
and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory...
belonging to the United States." But, in the judgment of the
court, that provision has no bearing on the present controversy and...
was intended to be confined, to the territory which at the time [of the
writing of the Constitution] belonged to, or was claimed by, the United
States... and can have no influence upon a territory afterwards acquired
from a foreign government.
The powers of the Government and the rights and privileges of the citizen
are regulated and plainly defined by the Constitution itself. And
when [the] Territory becomes a part of the United States, the Federal Government
enters... upon it with its powers over the citizens strictly defined, and
limited by the Constitution, from which it derives its own existence, and
by virtue of which alone it continues to exist and act as a Government
and sovereignty. It has no power of any kind beyond it; and it cannot,
when it enters into a Territory of the United States... [assume] despotic
powers which the Constitution has denied to it.... The Territory being
a part of the United States, the Government and the citizen both enter
it under the authority of the Constitution, with their respective rights
defined and marked out; and the Federal Government can exercise no power
over his person or property, beyond what that instrument confers, nor lawfully
deny any right which it has reserved....
The rights of private property have been guarded with equal care.
Thus the rights of property are united with the rights of person, and placed
on the same ground by the fifth amendment to the Constitution.... An Act
of Congress which deprives a person of the United States of his liberty
or property merely because he came himself or brought his property into
a particular Territory of the United States, and who had committed no offense
against the laws, could hardly be dignified with the name of due process
of law....
[The Constitution] places the citizens of a territory, so far as these
rights are concerned, on the same footing with the citizens of the States,
and guards them as firmly and plainly against any inroads which the general
government might attempt. And if Congress itself cannot do this ?
if it is beyond the powers conferred on the Federal Government ? ... it
could not authorize a territorial government to exercise them. [The
Federal Government] could confer no power on any local government... to
violate the provisions of the Constitution.
It seems, however, to be supposed, that there is a difference between
property in a slave and other property, and that different rules may be
applied to it.... [But] if the Constitution recognizes the right of property
of the master in a slave, and makes no distinction between that description
of property and other property owned by a citizen, no tribunal, acting
under the authority of the United States, whether it be legislative , executive,
or judicial, has a right to draw such a distinction, or deny to it the
benefit of the provisions and guarantees which have been provided for the
protection of private property against the encroachments of the Government....
[Now] the right of property in a slave is distinctly and expressly
affirmed in the Constitution. The right to traffic in it, like an
ordinary article of merchandise... was guaranteed to the citizens of the
United States .... No word can be found in the Constitution which gives
Congress a greater power over slave property, or which entitles property
of that kind to less protection than property of any other description.
The only power conferred is the power... of protecting the owner in his
rights.
Upon these considerations, it is the opinion of the court that the
Act of Congress [the Missouri Compromise] which prohibited a citizen from
holding and owning property of this kind in the territory of the United
States north of the line therein mentioned, is not warranted by the Constitution,
and is therefore void; and that neither Dred Scott himself, nor any of
his family were made free by being carried into this territory....
Upon the whole, therefore, it is judgment of this court, that it appears
by the record before us that the plaintiff in error is not a citizen of
Missouri, in the sense in which that word is used in the Constitution;
and that the [lower federal court]... for that reason, had no jurisdiction
in the case....